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RABINOWITZ TRIBUTES
JUDGE ANDREW J. KLEINFELD
This tribute was prepared by Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld as a preface to the bound compilation of Justice Jay A. Rabinowitz’s judicial opinions.

Justice Rabinowitz gave me my first look at the work of an
appellate judge, when I was his law clerk from 1969 to 1971. Much
of what I do now is influenced by how he did his work then.
The State of Alaska was only ten years old, so many cases
were matters of first impression. The Alaska Supreme Court was
of a vigorous and confident temperament, not inclined to dodge
issues. In R.L.R. v. State,1 Justice Rabinowitz passed comprehensively on all of the major constitutional issues which then affected
juvenile justice: The right to jury trial, the right to public trial, the
right to be present during trial, and the procedure for waiving
rights. R.L.R. was among the first of the state supreme court
opinions that used the state constitution rather than the United
States Constitution as a basis for deciding these kinds of issues.
The practical effect of this analytic device is to foster federalism
and a diversity of approaches from which the nation may gain the
benefit of experience, without the risk of experiments being imposed by federal courts on the entire nation.
In State v. Chaney,2 Justice Rabinowitz articulated the goals of
criminal sentences in Alaska in a manner which has stood up well
for three decades. In National Indemnity Co. v. Flesher,3 he explained with clarity the distinction between a liability insurer’s
duty of defense and its duty of coverage. To most law students and
law professors this would not sound important, but to most practicing lawyers, it obviously is. The law controlling insurance is
perhaps the most important body of law in practice for determin-

1. 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
2. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
3. 469 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970).
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ing who gets sued for what, because it determines who is worth
suing.
My personal favorites among the cases I worked on as a law
clerk tended to be the more ordinary ones, rather than the great
cases. Rego v. Decker4 was a particularly nice analysis of when a
contract is specific enough to be enforced. It dealt sensitively with
the distinction between a judge making up the contract, and a
judge filling gaps as the parties would have had they had the time
and money to draw up a more complete document. Brand v. First
5
Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n was aided by a particularly good
brief I recall, from Fred Brown, and was a model of how to construe a complex statute. It involved a mechanic’s lien statute, so
nearly all the conduct which would be affected by the decision
would be private and out of court, in the hurly-burly of construction projects trying to beat freeze-up. It was essential that the decision be right, and that it be clear.
There are two lessons I took with me from my clerkship. One
is that the public needs good judges more for the ordinary than for
the great cases. The other is that judges should do their own work.
The great cases lesson was a surprise. I applied for the clerkship with Justice Rabinowitz because I had been tremendously impressed by his dissents in a great case, Watts v. Seward School
6
Board. But I’ve learned that everyone has opinions on great issues, laymen’s opinions are usually as good as lawyers’ and judges’,
and you don’t have to search very hard for a lawyer who will do
high quality work as a judge on great cases. What is really difficult
is to interest a person whose money is not involved in a dispute
over a gas station lease, as in Rego v. Decker; or priority in payment for construction work, as in Brand v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Ass’n; or in how to read the language of an insurance policy,
as in National Indemnity Co. v. Flesher. People need courts and
judges for this work – they can resolve most great issues themselves through the political process. One sometimes hears judges
say amongst themselves that it does not matter what the resolution
is, so long as the docket is cleared of the case. That is not so. It
matters a great deal what the resolution is, and how the decision is
written, because otherwise injustice is done to the parties before
the court and to many people whose conduct subsequently is affected by the decision. The litigants and all of Alaska benefited
4. 482 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1971).
5. 478 P.2d 829 (Alaska 1970).
6. 421 P.2d 586, 610 (Alaska 1966) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting), vacated by
391 U.S. 592 (1968), on remand to 454 P.2d 732, 739 (Alaska 1969) (Rabinowitz,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970).
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because Justice Rabinowitz enjoyed working on these routine
cases and did it well.
The second lesson was that a judge can and should do his own
work. In those days, Justice Rabinowitz used to write his decisions
out longhand with a fountain pen. Doris Wilken would type them
up, and Bob Coates and I, his law clerks, would go over them for
substantive and formal correctness. In two years as a law clerk, I
can identify only one decision that I wrote. I don’t think this reflected my deficiencies as a writer, because my predecessor and
successor law clerks had the same experience. The practical effect
of Justice Rabinowitz writing his own decisions was that he understood the details of his cases, grounded his decisions on the facts in
the record, and caught errors which would have been missed had
the writing been delegated after the result was determined.
These were good lessons. One of them, that a judge should do
his own work, is now very much the minority position among state
and federal judges. In most American appellate courts today, law
clerks just out of law school, and even “externs” still in law school,
write the decisions, and judges edit them. In some, judges neither
read the briefs nor write the decisions – they just vote on outcomes
based on staff memoranda and edit staff drafts.
This damages both the quality and the legitimacy of what
courts do. Quality is harmed because however intelligent, inexperienced lawyers tend to be long on doctrine and short on the ability
to understand the facts in a record. It takes imagination borne of
experience to understand what happened from the papers in a record. You don’t really know exactly how a case of any difficulty
should be decided until relevant portions of the transcript, exhibits
and motion papers, and also the relevant statutes, regulations and
judicial decisions are all tabbed, underlined, spread out on a table
or the floor and studied with care. Editing is no substitute, because
a bright lawyer can make anything sound plausible. As for legitimacy, Justice Brandeis said that the reason the Supreme Court was
so respected in his day was that, alone of governmental institutions
in Washington, “[w]e do our own work.” The authority of judges
has much to do with their selection at the highest level of government, but if much of the real work of judging is done by persons
who have been selected by judges themselves rather than the
democratic organs of government, legitimacy of that authority is
diluted. Authority also is undermined if those choosing the outcomes do not really know exactly what they are doing.
I still apply these lessons learned from Justice Rabinowitz
when I was his law clerk. Though it is hard to apply them to
caseloads much larger than the Alaska Supreme Court then had,
the way Justice Rabinowitz performed the tasks of an appellate
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judge was, I am persuaded, the right way. He was a model of what
the citizens are entitled to expect of a judge.

